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In this paper, we employ reasons given by the United States Supreme Court to explain political obligations as a means of assessing different accounts of political obligations that have been advanced by scholars.1 Since the time of John Locke a variety of grounds have been suggested for why citizens should obey the state. Chief among these are consent, a natural duty of justice, gratitude, and fairness.2 We also consider arguments from utilitarian principles and a principle of reciprocity. Recent literature on political obligation has presented arguments for and against all of these positions, pointing out weaknesses as well as strengths. At this point, we believe that arguments from fairness have held up best and have the most potential to ground a satisfactory 'Throughout, we treat the question of political obligation as basically interchangeable with why people should obey the law. We also generally use the terms "obligation" and "duty" interchangeably; for discussion of these concepts, see Brandt (1964) ; Hart (1958) ; Mish'Alanai (1969) . In addition, we do not construe political obligations in a narrow sense, as necessarily grounded in voluntary actions. Strong moral reasons to obey the law would constitute an adequate theory of political obligation, whether or not these reasons stem from "obligations" in the strict sense. For discussio see Klosko (1992, chapter 1) ; Simmons (1979, chapters 1-2). 2These are the main principles discussed in Simmons (1979) .
THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, Vol. 60, No. 2, May 1998, Pp. 462-80 ? 1998 by the University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, Political Obligation and the United States Supreme Court 463 theory.3 Through the analysis of Supreme Court decisions, we can subject this conclusion to an indirect test. If fairness is indeed the strongest argument, we would expect reflective political actors to rely on it when justifying the obligations of individuals to obey specific laws. One institution that is worth studying in this regard is the United States Supreme Court.
Although Supreme Court justices are political actors appointed to their positions for what are usually political reasons, they are in an interesting position from the standpoint of political philosophy. Because they are appointed for life, they are essentially unaccountable to the public or to those who appointed and confirmed them. Further, justices are generally intelligent, well educated, and usually do not have personal interests at stake in the cases they decide. For each specific case, they are given all relevant information and have adequate time to deliberate, while their reasoning is also intended to be consistent from case to case, to be persuasive to their fellow citizens, and to be supported by later Courts. Because of these factors, decision making by the Supreme Court approximates the influential method of "reflective equilibrium" in moral philosophy put forth by John Rawls.4 When judicial decisions express consistent underlying principles that withstand critical scrutiny over time, their reasoning should be taken seriously by moral and political philosophers.5
We, of course, do not claim that Supreme Court opinions should be accepted as moral truth. One can employ Court decisions for philosophical purposes only with caution. Two immediate problems bear mention. First, the justices are not moral philosophers. They usually defend their opinions on the basis of statutory or constitutional interpretation and seldom appeal directly to moral principles or make abstract philosophical arguments. However, the justices do on occasion invoke moral principles to support their opinions, especially in difficult cases. In the range of cases that most interest us, they must decide whether specific individuals should be required to take actions for the state as opposed to merely refraining from action. These cases generally concern particularly onerous requirements individuals are asked to bear, especially military service, which could cost them their lives. When principles that different justices invoke in such cases survive critical scrutiny and are appealed to in subsequent decisions, they have a legitimate claim to our attention. 3The main discussions of the principle of fairness and political obligation are Dagger (1993) ; Klosko (1992); and Simmons (1979, chapter 5) . The main criticisms of fairness theories have concerned difficulties in "accepting" public goods; see Dworkin (1986, 192-93) ; Nozick (1974, 95) ; Rawls (1971, 113-16) ; Simmons (1979, chapter 5) ; this objection is dealt with in Klosko (1992, chapter 2). For additional criticisms, see Klosko (1992, 91) ; Simmons (1993, chapter 8) .
40n the general quality of Supreme Court justices see Abraham (1992) . On reflective equilibrium, see Daniels (1979) ; Rawls (1971, 19-21, 46-53, 578-86); and Rawls (1951) . For criticisms of the method, see Hare (1974) ; Lyons (1974); Singer (1974) . For the resemblances between judicial decision making and reflective equilibrium, see Dworkin (1977, chapter 4, 6) . 5The philosophical implications of judicial decisions are developed in Wertheimer (1987) , to which we are indebted. See also Pohlman (1993) .
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The second problem is that the Court is not a monolithic entity. Obviously, its composition changes over time. Individual justices have their own political and philosophical views, which have differed enormously throughout the Court's history. Because the Court is not a univocal body, any claims concerning "its reasoning" are necessarily selective. However, we do not believe such skeptical claims should be accepted without limits. The cases that we discuss are the ones in which the Court has addressed questions of political obligation most directly and most clearly articulated underlying moral principles. We have been unable to locate other cases that clearly present opposed views. As we will see, one case on which we draw heavily, Arver v. US. one of the famous "Selective Draft Law Cases," 245 U. S. 366 (1918) is an important precedent, referred to repeatedly in subsequent decades, when similar questions were before the Court (on which, more below).
Although the composition of the Court changes, the justices have been surprisingly consistent when they address the question of why specific citizens have obligations to obey specific laws. This is especially true in regard to requirements of military service. Looking at decisions in this area is particularly useful, not only because of the burdensome nature of military service, but because it is opposed to some people's religious beliefs and so is especially controversial. In dealing with these issues, the Court has consistently appealed to principles of a particular kind. Subsequent decisions invoke similar principles and have upheld earlier decisions, which are cited as precedents.
In the first section, we briefly outline the major theories of political obligation to which the Court could appeal. In the next section, we examine relevant cases.
The third section presents the evidence for fairness as the Court's preferred ground of political obligation, and the final section offers a brief conclusion.
Theories of Political Obligation
For reasons of clarity, we should begin by explaining what we mean by a moral principle underlying an obligation. As generally understood, an "obligation" is a particular kind of moral requirement, distinctive because of its specificity.6 Obligations are generally said to have three central features. Construed on the model of a promise, an obligation is viewed as (a) grounded on a specific voluntary action or performance; (b) owed to a particular person; and (c) having a determinate content. Thus, if Grey promises to give Brown $5.00, the obligation is (a) established by the promise Grey makes, (b) owed to Brown and not to other people, and (c) a requirement to pay Brown the $5.00. In general, we can assume that there must be a moral reason for a specific obligation to hold.7
In our example, the source of the obligation is of course Grey's promise.
60n the concept of obligation, see the articles cited above in note 1.
7This is also true of requirements other than obligations in the strict sense; thus if A has a duty to perform some service for B, we can presume that this too must have an underlying moral basis.
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By analogy, if Green, a citizen of country X, is obligated to provide military service, the question is, what is the source of this obligation? As we will see, the Court has generally answered that this is a reciprocal obligation that Green incurs in exchange for the protection he receives from his fellow citizens. But the moral principle underlying this reciprocal obligation is still not accounted for.
One obvious explanation would rely on the notion of agreement: Green's fellow citizens agree to protect him, if he agrees to serve in their armed forces. Such an arrangement would involve the basic liberal idea that political obligations rest on the consent of the governed.
The idea of consent is bound up with the social contract or contract of government, according to which citizens agree to obey government under certain conditions. When these conditions are not satisfied, the citizens recover their lib- Another popular, common sense justification of political obligation proceeds from consequentialist or utilitarian principles. Briefly, Jones should obey the law e.g., pay her taxes in order to promote the public good. Unless she pays, society will be harmed. But such an argument can also be faulted on factual grounds. Barring unusual circumstances, in a large society, the community would often actually be better off if Jones did not pay. Her contribution would barely be noticed, while if she did not pay, she would have extra money to spend on herself, her family, or some worthy cause, which might make a real difference in people's happiness. The flaw in consequentialist arguments for political obligations is that, on the whole, society requires general but not universal compliance with its edicts. If a certain amount of disobedience makes no notable difference, then it is difficult to require that a specific individual (e.g., Jones) obey."1 8Hume (1985) ; the best recent discussion is Simmons (1979, chapters 3-4) .
9The claim that large numbers of people have tacitly consented to government is demolished by Simmons (1979, chapter 4) . The clearest instances in which consent to government is relevant to political obligations are naturalization cases, in which oaths are discussed. See, for instance, Luria v.
United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913) and US. v. Amalia Manzi, 276 U.S. 463 (1928) . '?Even Beran (1987) , the best defense of consent theory in the literature, argues for "reformist consent" rather than "actual consent," i.e., that institutions should be changed to allow people to consent, not that adequate numbers have consented.
"1See Klosko (1992, chapter 6) ; Lyons (1965, chapter 5) ; for paradoxical cases, see Klosko (1990) ; for "contagion" or "snowball" arguments, see Glover (1975 gratitude, reciprocity as itself a basic moral principle, and fairness. We will sketch these in turn.
The concept of gratitude is familiar. 12 It holds that if Jones provides Smith with some benefit, Smith should express his appreciation to Jones and make an appropriate return, in order not to treat Jones merely as a means to his own ends.
Extended to the state, a gratitude account would have Green incur a moral requirement to obey the law in order to express his gratitude to his fellow citizens and not use them as means to his own ends. Although intuitively appealing, such theories have confronted strong objections and are not widely held among contemporary philosophers.13 The main problem is that although the provision of benefits may generate an obligation for Green to make some appropriate response, it follows from the expressive nature of gratitude that it is up to him to determine exactly what this response should be. This is problematic, because the state does not require just any suitable response for the protection it provides. It demands specific responses that, e.g., Jones serve in the military under conditions that it rather than he dictates. 14 By contrast, obligations of gratitude are like gifts; it is up to the giver rather the recipient to decide what the gift will be (Camenisch 1981) .
Another possible theory of obligation we must consider is based on reciprocity as an inherently binding moral notion. Although such a view is not widely discussed in the literature, it could be behind the Court's frequent invocations of reciprocal obligations. Lawrence Becker describes reciprocity as follows:
Reciprocity is a moral virtue. We ought to be disposed, as a matter of moral obligation, to return good in proportion to the good we receive, and to make reparation for the harm we have done. (Becker 1986, 3) According to an account of political obligation based on this notion, Green would be required morally to make appropriate return for the benefits he receives from the state, because he receives them. Such an argument has strong advantages over the alternatives we have discussed. Unlike a formal contract, reciprocity does not require that the recipient make return only for benefits he accepts. His reception of them is enough to create an obligation to obey the state (Becker 1986, 124-30) . Accordingly, the fact that Green has not consented to obey government in return for the benefits it provides does not undermine the argument from reciprocity. In addition, as Becker says, the requirement of reciprocity is to make a return that is "fitting and proportional" to what one has received (105-24). Thus, if Green receives protection from his fellow citizens, he has an obligation to contribute to protection himself by serving in the military . This line of argument, then, is able to circumvent the main problem with gratitude theories of political obligation.
12For the concept of gratitude, see Berger (1975); Camenisch (1981); Card (1988); Walker (1980-81) .
'3See Klosko (1989 Klosko ( , 1991 ; Simmons (1979, chapter 7) ; Walker (1988 Walker ( , 1989 .
'4The best attempt to get around this problem in the literature is Walker (1988) , discussed in the additional articles cited in the previous note. As we will see, the Court's language is often consistent with a reciprocity explanation. While the Court does not speak of obligations of consent or gratitude, it does discuss reciprocal obligations. Because the justices make little effort to explain the moral force of these obligations, it is possible that they have viewed them as inherently binding. But we believe that the concept of reciprocity cannot alone ground political obligations.
Although considerations of space preclude detailed discussion of the concept of reciprocity, one point should be noted briefly. One reason not to view reciprocal obligations as inherently binding is that this could make other moral principles otiose. If the fact that A gives B an important benefit generates an obligation of reciprocity for B to make an appropriate return, it is not necessary to invoke concepts of consent, gratitude, or fairness to explain B's obligation to return the benefit. However, because it is unusual not to appeal to one of these other principles, either instead of or along with reciprocity, it seems that reciprocity alone does not explain particular moral requirements.
We believe that, rather than being an inherent moral notion, reciprocity is actually a family of moral requirements, each of which centers on returning benefits for benefits received. The principles underlying different requirements are the ones we have noted: consent, gratitude, fairness and perhaps others.
Not only do different forms of reciprocity rest on different moral principles, but unless one of these is also in effect, an obligation of reciprocity will not obtain.
In other words, in any given case in which an obligation of reciprocity can be identified, it actually rests on one of these principles rather than on reciprocity simpliciter
The limitations of reciprocity are clear in regard to public goods. If Smith does a favor for Jones, the latter might decide on an appropriate response with little difficulty. But things are far more complex in regard to benefits that are jointly produced, especially public goods (see Becker 1986, 111-27 ; on public goods, see below). If a large group of people supplies Jones with the benefits of national defense, how should she respond? She cannot make an appropriate return to each of her benefactors individually. As Becker says, because important jointly produced goods are generally products of ongoing institutions, the appropriate response is "reciprocal participation" in the institutions from which benefits derive (1986, 114 (1986, 62) . On this criterion, however, appeals to reciprocity in regard to institutions that provide public goods do not ground reciprocal obligations. In any given case, the reciprocal obligation can be traced back to the principle of fairness, which is more likely to be grounded in Becker's sense.
The last moral principle we will discuss is the principle of fairness. This was originally formulated by H. L. A. Hart in 1955:
[W]hen a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission. (Hart 1955, 186)15 The moral basis of the principle is the mutuality of restrictions. Under specified conditions, the sacrifices made by members of a cooperative schenLe in order to produce benefits also benefit noncooperators, who do not make similar sacrifices. According to the principle, this situation is unfair; the principle is intended to justify the obligations of noncooperators. According to David Lyons, the underlying moral principle at work in the principle of fairness is "the just distribution of benefits and burdens" (Lyons 1965, 164) . According to John
Rawls: "We are not to gain from the cooperative labors of others without doing our fair share" (1971, 112).
Considerations of space limit discussion of the principle of fairness to a few central points.16 As a basis for political obligations, the principle of fairness is closely related to reciprocity, especially in regard to obligations to help supply public goods. But fairness is distinctive in two respects. First, while obligations of reciprocity can arise from receipt of benefits generally, fairness obligations are incurred only by benefits that are jointly produced, especially public goods.
Public goods are nonexcludable; they cannot be provided to specific members of society without being made available to a wider population. National defense and relief from air pollution are paradigmatic cases of public goods. In addition, relevant public goods must be costly to provide. If people did not have incentives to avoid the costs of providing them, questions of obligations would not arise.
The second feature is that obligations of fairness have distinctive binding force. The underlying moral principle is often associated with opposition to "free riding." If Jones profits from a public good that is provided by the cooperative efforts of others, she should cooperate as well. Because she benefits from other members of society doing their fair shares, it would be unfair of Jones not to do her fair share, unless there were significant morally relevant differences between her and her fellow citizens. In other words, a distinctive feature of fairness obligations is that they ground obligations a given person incurs in the existence of a cooperative association of her fellow citizens in which each bears his or her fair 5Hart was anticipated by Broad (1915-16) and Ewing (1953 share of the overall burdens. We have seen something similar in regard to obligations of reciprocity bearing on public goods-which is of course our reason for believing that the two moral notions are closely related.
In recent years, the principle of fairness has been developed into a general theory of political obligation. The most prevalent approach concentrates on particular public goods deemed essential for people who would lead meaningful lives. The goods include physical security: national defense, law and order, and the provision of basic public health measures (Klosko 1992, chap. 2) . It bears mention that providing these benefits is generally viewed as the state's central function. We should also note that fairness theory has on the whole held up better in the philosophical literature than theories based on consent and gratitude.
To some extent this is because it has been developed only recently. American duties because "where there is no protection or allegiance or sovereignty, there can be no claim to obedience" (254). Though Story's exact meaning is unclear, it seems that, in a single sentence, he appeals to "allegiance"-based perhaps on consent as well as to an exchange between obedience and protection (on which, more below). Accordingly, we do not claim that the Court has appealed to only one moral principle to justify political obligations. In some cases the Court does not appeal to any moral principle at all, while in cases in which it discusses general obligations to obey the law, it frequently refers to commonsense notions of consent or utility. However, evidence shows that, when 7For references, see above, note 3.
'8We are indebted for this point to Ernie Alleva; the most prominent philosophical anarchist is Simmons (1979 Simmons ( , 1993 ; see also Wolff (1970 "The only reason, I believe, why a free man is bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself" (456). In addition, "the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure source of equality and justice must be founded on the CONSENT of these, whose obedience they require" (458).19 While these statements are not unimportant, they are not essential to the substantial holding of the case-that a state may be sued by a citizen of another state. More important, these points were not expressed in order to account for specific moral requirements of specific people. It would have been difficult for the Court to argue along these lines when specific individuals could not be shown to have consented. Because of the prominence of consent theory, the possibility that political obligations do rest on consent was probably considered by many justices.
The fact that they have not made this argument constitutes something akin to rejection of consent theory.
Along similar lines, the fact that we have found no case in which the Court argues that particular individuals are required to serve in the military out of gratitude for the benefits they receive tells strongly against the plausibility of such a claim.
Our conclusion is similar in regard to the Court's use of utilitarian or consequentialist language. To the unwary reader, appeals to the "common good" or the "good and welfare of the commonwealth," as in the compulsory vaccination case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (at 26, 27), might indicate utilitarian theories of obligation. Further, at a more sophisticated level, arguments based on "contagion" or "snowball effects" appear in decisions.
According to this line of argument, Jones should obey a given law for fear that, if she does not, large numbers of other people will not do so either. In US. v. the Court has ordinarily used the idea of "common good" as a starting point for arguments that ultimately depend on principles of reciprocity or fairness. And so it has moved beyond weak consequentialist reasoning to more defensible arguments based on these principles. Accordingly, as we will see below, a case such as Jacobson, which at first glance seems to make a utilitarian argument, is better understood as justifying political obligation on the basis of fairness.
A prominent theme in the Court's reasoning about the political obligations of identifiable individuals is that people have "reciprocal obligations" to government in return for important benefits government provides, mainly protection.
The idea that political obligations are "reciprocal obligations" was first clearly Citizenship is membership in a political society, and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. (22) The idea that the nature of citizenship is found in the exchange between allegiance and protection predated Minor v. Happersett by almost a centuryalthough the term "reciprocal obligation" was not used. In the early expatriation case Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. 133 (1795), Justice James Iredell, in his seriatim opinion, denied that citizens can simply renounce their citizenship at any time.
He noted:
It is not the exercise of a natural right, in which the individual is to be considered as alone concerned. As every man is entitled to claim rights in society, which it is the duty of the society to protect; he, in his turn, is under a solemn obligation to discharge all those duties faithfully, which he owes, as a citizen, to the society of which he is a member, and as a man to the several members of the society individually with whom he is associated. (162) In US. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), Justice Gray argued along similar lines. This case held that children born to noncitizens in America automatically become citizens. On the basis of a lengthy exploration of English common law, Gray concluded: "Such allegiance and protection were mutual as expressed in the maxim protectio trahit subjectionem subjectio protectionemand were not restricted to natural born subjects and naturalized subjects" (655). benefit, as we have seen, is mutual protection. This is produced by the joint efforts of the group, and in return for this, each individual owes allegiance to the other members of the group. In return for protection, the individual owes allegiance "to the several members of the society" who provide it.
The nature of the individual's obligation to this political association was the subject of numerous cases, several of which concern the obligation to provide military service. In ruling on different aspects of military obligation, the justices have generally held that Americans have reciprocal obligations to obey the government in exchange for protection. During World War I, the Court addressed the extent to which the state can require individuals to fight in a war.
In Arver v. US., 245 U. S. 366 (1918) , the constitutionality of the draft was if it means what it seems to say, is an astonishing statement. Of course there is no such principle of the Constitution, fixed or otherwise. The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied; but because, and only because, it has accorded with the policy of Congress thus to relieve him. (623) Sutherland argued that one cannot appeal to a higher law to avoid an obligation to defend the United States. Permitting this would allow a person to put "his own interpretation" of the will of God above that of the country.
The Court has thus firmly held that Congress has an essentially unlimited right The language here clearly implies that the obligation in question is one of fairness. The citizen is not required simply to serve in return for protection, as would be consistent with the idea of reciprocity as a basic moral notion. Rather, his obligation is to contribute his proportion toward the costs of protection. In Arver the Court conceived of society as an association in which "every member" contributes his share to the expense of common benefits. This conceptualization of society is also explicit in the government's arguments before the Court in the Arver case, which the Court apparently adopted: "Compulsory military service is not contrary to the spirit of democratic institutions, for the Constitution implies equitable distribution of the burdens no less than the benefits of citizenship" (Arver v. US., at 371). Thus, the Court has suggested that, with all other people contributing their proportions, it would be unfair of the citizen in question not to contribute his or hers.
Arver presents additional evidence for a fairness conception of obligation. In total war it is necessary that a civilian make sacrifices of his property and profits with at least the same fortitude as that with which a drafted soldier makes his traditional sacrifices of comfort, security, and life itself. (754) Once again, the underlying principle here is fairness. All individuals alike have obligations to contribute to the war effort, although their specific roles may differ. As noted above, it is up to the government to say exactly how each individual's obligation must be met. This decision, which relies on Arver as central authority, is therefore consistent with other decisions requiring all citizens to contribute to the public good unless there are morally relevant differences between them (756, 758) .25 24On the importance of Arve,; see Malbin (1972 forced to justify such requirements, it has most often appealed to reciprocal obligations, and when these are examined carefully, to fairness. The best examples of the Court's reasoning are cases requiring individuals to contribute toward society's protection. In these cases, the justices have most often upheld requirements for specific individuals to serve in the military, or to make related contributions, on the basis of fairness. Each individual must contribute his or her share to the common good; it would be unfair for them not to contribute unless they could produce strong moral reasons why they need not do so.
In addition to the evidence supporting the principle of fairness, it bears mention that the Court provides indirect evidence against other theories of political obligation. It has not argued from familiar principles of consent or gratitude. We believe that the fact that the Court has consistently traced obligations to obey the state back to protection the state provides also tells strongly against currently popular views of political obligation as rooted in other kinds of principles, for instance, a natural duty of justice, or a principle of association.26 Rather, as we have seen, obligations have been grounded on different, more commonsense notions, concerning the exchange between obligations and protection, and each person's requirement to contribute his share to the common good.
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